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CIVIL FORFEITURE-New Mexico Restricts the Use of
Civil Forfeiture: State v. One 1990 Chevrolet Pickup
I.

INTRODUCTION

In State v. One 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals held that forfeiture of a vehicle is not allowed when controlled
substances found in the vehicle are possessed for personal use.' Forfeiture
is allowed only when possession is for the purpose of sale. 2 1990 Chevrolet
Pickup sets clear guidelines for trial courts to follow absent an express
legislative amendment to allow forfeiture when drugs are possessed solely
for personal use. The decision replaced a previous New Mexico Supreme
Court decision, State v. Stevens, which held that an earlier version of
section 30-31-34(D) of the New Mexico Statutes allowed forfeiture when
a vehicle was used to transport an illegal substance, regardless of whether
the transportation was for the purpose of sale. 3 Stevens itself had overturned a previous court of appeals decision allowing forfeiture only when
transportation of the illegal substance was for the purpose of sale. 4 This
Note will examine the court's statutory interpretation of section 30-3134(D), discuss the intent of the legislature in enacting and later amending
the statute, and analyze the effect this holding -will have on civil in rem
proceedings in New Mexico. Furthermore, this Note will explore the trend
in State and Federal law regarding the use of forfeiture statutes when
possession of an illegal substance is for personal use only.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Three district court cases were consolidated into 1990 Chevrolet Pickup.5
Each case hinged on a determination of whether section 30-31-34(D)

1. 115 N.M. 644, 857 P.2d 44 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 602, 856 P.2d 250 (1993)
(citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-34(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). The property subject to forfeiture
includes: "all conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used or intended for
use to transport or in any manner to facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale of
property .....
2. Id.
3. 100 N.M. 577, 673 P.2d 1310 (1983). The latest amendment to § 30-31-34(D) occurred in
1981, but the court in Stevens interpreted an earlier version of the statute that was no longer in
effect when the case was decided. The court did not explain why it utilized the older version of
the statute.
4. Id. at 579, 673 P.2d at 1312 (1983) (overruling State of New Mexico v. Barela, 93 N.M.
700, 604 P.2d 838 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 674, 615 P.2d 991 (1980)).
5. 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 115 N.M. at 645, 857 P.2d at 45 (1993). Two of the cases involved
the State's appeal of two orders granting motions which relied on the same factual occurrence
("The Spencer case"). One order granted Fernando Spencer's motion for summary judgment
disallowing forfeiture, and the other order granted Spencer's motion allowing him to use his pickup
pending the final decision on appeal. 1990 Chevrolet Pickup (Nos. 13,728 and 14,242). The other
case was Forfeiture of One 1990 Ford Ranger Pickup v. Ortega (No. 13,731) ("The Ortega case").
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allows for the forfeiture of a vehicle when the owner is in possession
of illegal substances which are for personal use only. The trial courts
in these cases came to opposite conclusions.
The Spencer Case
In the Spencer case, the vehicle was stopped at a border patrol checkpoint on February 24, 1991.6 The border patrol agent asked Spencer to
proceed to an inspection area, where the agent then asked him to empty
his pockets. White flakes came out of Spencer's pockets, and a search
of Spencer and his truck uncovered a total amount of cocaine of approximately two grams.7
The State initiated forfeiture proceedings against Spencer's 1990 Chevrolet pickup two days after his arrest. Both parties stipulated that the
truck was not used for the purpose of sale. At trial, the court granted
summary judgment in favor of Spencer. The State appealed the orders
of the trial court, but the court of appeals affirmed the trial court,
holding that section 30-31-34(D) curbs forfeiture when the drugs possessed
were for personal use and not for the purpose of sale.'

A.

The Ortega Case
The Ortega case reached a different result. Thomas Ortega was stopped
in Luna County and arrested for driving while intoxicated. 9 During the
booking process, a small quantity of cocaine was found in Ortega's wallet
inside a folded $100.00 bill. Ortega pleaded guilty in municipal court to
the DWI charge, and the City of Deming then brought a forfeiture action
against Ortega's truck.' 0
Ortega's motion for summary judgment disallowing forfeiture was
dismissed, and the trial court ordered that the truck be forfeited. Ortega
appealed the trial court's order, and the trial court stayed the forfeiture
order pending the outcome of the appeal." The court of appeals reversed
the trial court's order of forfeiture, after finding that section 30-31-34(D)
was intended to combat drug trafficking and does not permit forfeiture
2
of property when drugs are possessed solely for personal use.'

B.

6. 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 115 N.M. at 645, 857 P.2d at 45.
7. Id. Spencer was indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, but pled guilty
to possession of cocaine (a fourth degree felony). New Mexico's forfeiture statute is a civil in rem
proceeding, so the State could have brought a forfeiture action against Spencer's vehicle regardless
of whether criminal charges were ever filed against him. Id. at 646, 857 P.2d at 46.
8. Id. at 646, 857 P.2d at 46.
9. 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 115 N.M. at 646, 857 P.2d at 46.
10. As in the Spencer case, the parties stipulated that the controlled substance in Ortega's wallet
was for his personal use only.
11. 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 115 N.M. at 646, 857 P.2d at 46.
12. Id. at 648-49, 857 P.2d at 48-49.
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III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL FORFEITURE
The parties and amici 13 in this case raised a number of statutory
construction issues designed to ascertain legislative intent; however, the
court's decision was also based on policy grounds. A firm grasp of civil
forfeiture's history is crucial to understanding the court's analysis.
The earliest form of civil forfeiture in the United States can be traced
back to admiralty law and the heyday of pirates.14 Civil statutory forfeiture
was enacted to deal with the escalating number of ships involved in
piracy, and the fact that the owners of the vessels rarely made themselves
available for normal criminal proceedings. 5 Civil forfeiture was later used
to forfeit real property and to stop the flow of alcohol during the
prohibition era. 16 History shows that civil forfeiture is "too firmly fixed
in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now
displaced." 7
A.

Federal Civil Forfeiture and the UCSA
The enactment of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970 (the Controlled Substances Act)'" initiated the increased use of civil in rem forfeiture as a tool to combat the growing
problem of drug abuse. 19 Its broad scope makes allowances for "personal
use" of drugs; however, federal prosecutors practiced a policy of not
seeking forfeiture of vehicles for simple possession of a small quantity
of drugs. 20 This policy changed with the advent of the Reagan Administration's "zero tolerance" policy towards drug users. 21 While zero tolerance seizures are no longer used as often, "random infliction of senselessly
harsh punishment on drug users" still occurs u
Enacted after the Controlled Substances Act, the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act (UCSA) does not target the personal drug user. 23 The
.

13. The New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association and the New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers
Association both filed amicus curiae briefs in the Ortega case. Id. at 645, 857 P.2d at 45.
14. Walter J. Van Eck, The New Oregon Civil Forfeiture Law, 26 WiI.AmEre L. REv. 449,
450-53 (1990) ("A pirate vessel was forfeitable by virtue of its illegal use alone; no proof that the
owner was implicated needed to be adduced.").
15. Id.
16. Id. at 453-54.
17. Id.
18. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-565, 84
Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-971 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994)).
19. T.J. Hiles, Civil Forfeitureof Property for Drug Offenders under Illinois and FederalStatute:
Zero Tolerance, Zero Exceptions, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 389, 390-92 (1992). The Act allows for
the forfeiture of: "[a]ll conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used or
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt,
possession or concealment .... " 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(4) (West Supp. 1994).
20. DAvm C. Smrrs, PROSECUTION A
DassEcS .! FORFEITURE CAsEs
4.02 (12th ed. 1993).
21. This new policy often resulted in inequitable results. For instance, boats and cars were seized
by the Customs Service and Coast Guard whenever even minuscule amounts of drugs were foundregardless of whether the owner had knowledge of the presence of drugs. Id.; see also Hiles, supra
note 19, at 390-94.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 4-18. The federal statute allows forfeiture merely for "possession or concealment"
while the UCSA requires illegal substances to be held "for the purpose of sale or receipt of
property."
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UCSA was "designed to complement the new Federal narcotic and dangerous drug legislation and provide an interlocking trellis of Federal and
State law to enable government at all levels to control more effectively
the drug abuse problem." 24 In particular, the UCSA was designed to
combat drug traffickers,25 and to contain the flow of drugs across state
and international lines.
The UCSA was originally approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws in 1970, in order to achieve
uniformity among the states in the application of their forfeiture provisions. 26 The provisions were designed to allow states to bring forfeiture
proceedings against property that previously was either forfeited to the
27
federal government or was not being forfeited at all. While New Mexico
and other states have amended and modified the UCSA, the varied state
2
forfeiture provisions were established based on section 505 of the UCSA. 1
A recent United States Supreme Court decision reveals a trend limiting
the use of civil forfeiture in some instances, partially as a response to
law enforcement's increasing reliance on forfeiture to "punish" the property owner. In Austin v. United States,29 the Court held that since
forfeitures can be considered punishment, the excessive fines clause of
the Eighth Amendment should be used to limit the reach of civil in rem
forfeiture. 0 Austin provides a helpful defense for property owners who
face forfeiture for simple possession of drugs.
State Civil Forfeiture: Allowed or Disallowed?
States have varied in their interpretation of state forfeiture acts, and
the results they want accomplished through the forfeiture provisions.
Those states disallowing forfeiture in personal use drug cases have often
focused on the similarity of the state statue to section 505 of the UCSA
B.

24. UNi. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 2. Compare 21 U.S.C.A.
881 (West 1981 & Supp. 1994).
25. UNrF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 505 cmt.: "[T]his section is designed to provide
forfeiture provisions [for] .. .confiscating the vehicles .. .used by drug traffickeis ...." 9 U.L.A.
835 (1970). The mobility of traffickers requires a uniform approach over local, state, national and
international levels. Id. at 2.
26. See UNiF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT (prefatory notes), 9 U.L.A. 2 (1970). The UCSA
is designed to replace the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act of 1933, and the Model State Drug Abuse
Control Act of 1966. Id.
27. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 505 & cmt., 9 U.L.A. 835 (1970).
28. See id. § 505(4) (stating that all "conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which
are used, or intended for use to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation for
the purpose of sale or receipt of property" are subject to forfeiture). The section covers all controlled
substances and all raw materials which are in violation of the act. Id. § 505(l)-(2); see also ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 36-2501 to 36-2553 (Michie 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 2la-240 to 21a-308
(1972); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-20 to 16-13-56 (1974). The court in 1990 Chevrolet Pickup relied
extensively on the history of the UCSA. See 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 115 N.M. at 648-49, 857 P.2d
at 48-49.
29. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
30. Id. at 2804-06 (citing 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(4) (West Supp. 1994)).

§
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and the intent of the state legislature to allow forfeiture in drug trafficking
cases only."
For example, Florida and South Dakota originally disallowed forfeiture
in personal use cases. In Griffis v. State, the Florida Supreme Court
held that express legislative intent made it clear that the state forfeiture
statute should be read in conformity with the UCSA, and the UCSA
only allowed forfeiture when the vehicle was utilized for drug trafficking.32
Indeed, the Florida court noted that even though the Uniform Act's
forfeiture provisions were reworded when adopted by Florida, "the forfeiture statutes proscribe substantially the same conduct as § 505 of the
[UCSA]

."3

Similarly, in State v. One 1972 Pontiac Grand Prix,34 the South Dakota
court held that the legislature did not intend for forfeiture to apply to
misdemeanor amounts of marijuana. 35 The court noted that the South
Dakota statute was based on the UCSA and should be construed iden6
tically.1
On the other hand, those states allowing forfeiture of vehicles in
personal use cases typically focus on legislative intent and changes made
by state legislatures to forfeiture statutes after courts originally disallowed
forfeiture. For example, the holdings in One 1972 Pontiac Grand Prix
and in Griffis were superseded by newly amended statutes which specifically allowed forfeiture even when the drugs were for personal consumption . Other states that allowed forfeiture in personal use cases
focused on the state acts' similarity to the federal forfeiture statute,
rather than to the UCSA, and reasoned that since the federal act potentially allowed forfeiture in personal consumption cases, so should the
38

state act.

31. See State v. One 1983 Pontiac, 717 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1986) (forfeiture statute strikes at drug
traffickers, not individuals whose possession is solely for personal consumption); State v. One 1972
Pontiac Grand Prix, 242 N.W.2d 660 (S.D. 1976) (vehicle forfeiture used to combat narcotics peddler
and drug trafficker); State v. Fouse, 355 N.W.2d 366 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (purpose of forfeiture
provision is to deter drug trafficking).
32. 356 So. 2d 297, 302 (Fla. 1978).
33. Id.at 301.
34. 242 N.W.2d 660 (S.D. 1976).
35. Id.at 662-63.
36. Id. at 662. The court indicated that the state forfeiture statute was changed slightly when
adopted by the legislature, but was "substantially the same" as § 505 of the UCSA. Id. at 661.
37. See State v. One 1983 Black Toyota Pickup, 415 N.W.2d 511 (S.D. 1987) (the court could
no longer find an intent to disallow forfeiture of a conveyance when the drugs conveyed are for
the personal possession and consumption of the owner of the vehicle under amended 1985 statute);
In re Forfeiture of the Following v. Small, 426 So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (statute
construed in Griffis was revised in 1980 to allow forfeiture of any felony amount of drugs, regardless
of whether vehicle was used to "facilitate" the commission of a crime); see also In re One 1965
Ford Econoline Van, 591 P.2d 569 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (statute's legislative intent indicated
forfeiture not limited to trafficking alone); State v. One 1988 Chevrolet Camaro, 813 P.2d 1186
(Utah 1991) (amendment of the word "possession" to "simple possession" indicated legislative intent
to allow forfeiture even if drugs possessed only for vehicle owner's personal use).
38. See Hughes v. State Dep't of Safety, 776 S.W.2d Ill (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (legislature
intended to make state law same as federal forfeiture statute, and 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) allows
forfeiture regardless of quantity of illegal substance) (called into doubt by amended statute, Hill
v. Lawson, 851 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)).
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Regardless, states which do allow forfeiture when drugs are possessed

for personal use typically do not rely on a state act which is in substantial
conformity with the UCSA. 39
C.

Civil in Rem Forfeiture in New Mexico
Like most other states, the New Mexico forfeiture statute has its origins

in the UCSA. New Mexico's original forfeiture statute was enacted in
drafted. 40 The legislature adopted
1972, two years after the UCSA was
4

section 505 of the UCSA verbatim. '
The first amendment of the act occurred in 1975 when the words "or

' 42 In 1979, the court
receipt" were deleted after "for purpose of sale."

of appeals had its first opportunity to interpret the amended statute in
State v. Barela.4 1 While the defendant in Barela used his truck to drive
the undercover officer to and from the point of sale, the actual sale was
at a physically different location. The state sought forfeiture of the
defendant's truck, but the trial court granted summary judgment to the

defendant and the state appealed. 4 Affirming the trial court's order, the
court of appeals interpreted the statute narrowly, requiring that the
"transportation aspect of the statute must be transportation ...

purpose of

sale." ' 45

for the

The court reasoned that its strict approach was

necessary because forfeiture is quasi-criminal in nature and was used to

penalize defendants for an offense against the law. 46
In construing the statute this narrowly, the supreme court declined to
follow broader federal forfeiture statutes. 47 The court noted that removal
to restrict the appliof "or receipt" indicated a clear legislative intent
48
statute.
forfeiture
Mexico
New
the
of
cability

39. See In re 1965 Ford Econoline Van, 591 P.2d 569 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (statute allows
forfeiture of vehicle when illegal substance found in vehicle, regardless of amount of drugs or
whether intended only for personal consumption); State v. Connelly, 483 A.2d 1085 (Conn. 1984)
(owner of vehicle stipulated that .18 ounces of cocaine was for own use); State v. One 1967 Ford
Mustang, 292 A.2d 64 (Md. 1972); State v. One Motor Vehicle, 507 A.2d 633 (Md. 1986) (use of
a vehicle for possession of drugs is enough to invoke forfeiture; no commercial aspect is required);
Commonwealth v. One 1983 Toyota Corolla, 578 A.2d 90 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (forfeiture
proceedings are civil in form, and de minimis statute does not require the state to prove possession
of any minimum amount of cocaine, regardless of how small the amount); Hughes, 776 S.W.2d
111 (use of a vehicle to drive to an illegal sale will subject vehicle to forfeiture regardless of purpose
for which controlled substance was purchased); One 1988 Chevrolet Camaro, 813 P.2d 1186 (amendment of forfeiture act indicated legislative intent to allow forfeiture when possession is for own
use and owner of vehicle has no intent to distribute).
40. 1972 N.M. Laws ch. 84, § 33.
41. 1972 N.M. Laws ch. 84, § 33. The applicable subsection of the forfeiture statute read: "D.
all conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used, or intended for use, to
transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale or receipt of
property described in Subsections A or B."
42. 1975 N.M. Laws ch. 231, § 31.
43. 93 N.M. 700, 701, 604 P.2d 838, 839 (Ct. App. 1979).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 702, 604 P.2d at 840.
46. Id. at 703, 604 P.2d at 841.
47. Id. at 702, 604 P.2d at 840 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)).
48. Id. at 702-03, 604 P.2d at 840-41.
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Despite facts indicating the defendant was a drug trafficker, the court's
concern with the potential misuse of the forfeiture provision prevailed. 49
Specifically, the court pointed to the holdings in State v. Ozarek50 as
support for its ruling that forfeiture statutes are penal in nature and
should be measured by the same standards relevant in a criminal proceeding."'
The dissent in Barela sharply criticized the majority's reasoning.5 2 The
dissent asserted that the primary target of forfeiture provisions is the
narcotic peddler and drug trafficker, and the purpose of forfeiture is to
deny traffickers of mobility; the dissent inferred that the defendant was
such a trafficker.5 3
The legislature amended section 30-31-34(D) most recently in 1981 by
removing three commas which separated the restrictive clause "for the
purpose of sale" from the preceding clauses.5 4 However, when the court
next looked at section 30-31-34(D) in State v. Stevens, it interpreted the
older version of the statute that had existed at the time of the Barela
decision." 5
The court in Stevens broadened the applicability of section 30-31-34(D)
by permitting forfeiture of vehicles used to transport drugs, even if the
transportation was not for the purpose of sale.5 6 Stevens argued that the
sale was completed before transporting the marijuana in the vehicle, and
therefore his vehicle was not subject to forfeiture. 57 The supreme court
dismissed Stevens' argument and held that Barela's interpretation of 3031-34(D) was contrary to the meaning of the statute.' However, the facts
in Stevens did not warrant such a broad holding because the owner of
the vehicle was a drug trafficker who was trying to avoid forfeiture by
arguing that the sale had taken place before the transportation of the
drugs, as opposed to after the sale of drugs.5 9

49. Id.
50. 91 N.M. 275, 573 P.2d 209 (1978).
51. Barela, 93 N.M. at 702-03, 604 P.2d at 840-41 (citing Ozarek, 91 N.M. 275, 573 P.2d 209).
52. Barela, 93 N.M. at 703, 604 P.2d at 841 (Sutin, J., dissenting).
53. Id.
54. 1981 N.M. Laws ch. 31, § 3 (codified as amended at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-34(D) (Repl.
Pamp. 1989)). The new subsection reads:
"(D) all conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used or intended for use to
transport or in any manner to facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale of property
described in Subsection A or B of this section." The relevant part of the older version stated: "all
conveyances . . . which are used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate
the transportation for the purpose of sale of property described in subsection a or b .
1975 N.M. LAWS ch. 231, § 1.
55. 100 N.M. 577, 673 P.2d 1310 (1983) (overruling Barela). The facts of Stevens arose in 1982,
but the court did not explain its rationale for interpreting the older version of the statute. See id.
56. Id. at 579, 673 P.2d at 1312.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 578, 673 P.2d at 1311. In Stevens, the court held that the appellant actually used
the vehicle to transport marijuana for the purpose of sale. Id. There was no indication that the
illegal substance had ever been in Barela's vehicle prior to the completion of the sale. See Barela,
93 N.M. at 701, 604 P.2d at 839.
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The court in Stevens read the old section 30-31-34(D) according to its
"grammatical sense.' ' 6 Thus, the court relied heavily on the rule that
"a restrictive clause only applies to the words or phrase immediately
'6
preceding it and not to others more remote." ' In addition, the court
noted that a comma could not be placed between a restrictive clause and
what it is trying to restrict. 62 Applying these rules of statutory construction
to section 30-31-34(D), the court argued that the phrase "for the purpose
of sale" restricted only the immediate preceding phrase "or in any manner
to facilitate transportation" and not the phrase "to transport.' '63 Therefore, the court concluded that a vehicle is subject to forfeiture if used
to transport an illegal substance and the transportation does not have
to be for the purpose of sale.
Under Barela, drug traffickers could beat the forfeiture provisions by
simply completing a sale before transporting the illegal substances in the
vehicle. Under the standard in Stevens, however, any vehicle could be
subject to forfeiture, as long as illegal substances are transported in the
vehicle-including when the drugs are for personal use only.
DISCUSSION OF 1990 CHEVROLET PICKUP
In 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, the court of appeals addressed the issue of
whether section 30-31-34(D) permits forfeiture of a vehicle whose owner64
is in possession of drugs which are solely for the owner's personal use.
Effectively overruling Stevens on the basis that the statute interpreted in
Stevens was no longer in effect, the court of appeals held that in order
for a vehicle to be forfeited under section 30-31-34(D), possession of
drugs must be for the purpose of sale. 65 The court in 1990 Chevrolet
Pickup took the favorable facts from the consolidated cases and narrowed
the scope of the forftiture provision in New Mexico. Importantly, unlike
the defendants in Stevens and Barela, who the facts indicated were drug
traffickers, the defendants in the consolidated cases in 1990 Chevrolet
Pickup were not traffickers. 66 In addition, the court noted that states
which allowed forfeiture where simple possession of drugs was involved
67
did not rely on a "technical grammatical analysis of a statute." Rather,
these states relied on specific legislative changes to a statute which provided
for forfeiture when a controlled substance was possessed for personal
6
8
use or when possession of the controlled substance constituted a felony.
IV.

60. Stevens, 100 N.M. at 579, 673 P.2d at 1312 (citing Aetna Fin. Co. v. Gutierrez, 96 N.M.
538, 541, 632 P.2d 1176 (1981)).
61. Id. The restrictive clause in § 30-31-34 is "for purposes of sale."
62. Id.
63. Id.; see also supra note 60.
64. 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 115 N.M. at 645, 857 P.2d at 45.
65. Id. at 647, 857 P.2d at 47. The 1981 amendment of § 30-31-34(D) removed three commas.
1981 N.M. LAWS ch. 31, § 3. See supra note 54.
66. The parties in the Spencer and Ortega cases stipulated that the illegal substances in question
were for "personal use" only. 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 115 N.M. at 645-46, 857 P.2d at 45-46.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 648-49, 857 P.2d at 48-49 (citing State v. Crenshaw, 548 So. 2d 223 (Fla 1989); State
v. One 1983 Black Toyota Pickup, 415 N.W.2d 511 (S.D. 1987)).
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Finally, the court discussed the similarity between the UCSA and section
30-31-34(D), and noted that the UCSA supports the contention that the
purpose of the New Mexico act is to "disrupt drug trafficking. ' '6 9
Statutory Construction: Means to an End?
The 1990 Chevrolet Pickup court made it clear that its interpretation
of the forfeiture statute would not rest solely on the rules of statutory
construction. The court recognized the "last antecedent rule" 70 upon
which the court in Stevens had relied so heavily as a valid method of
statutory construction. 7' However, the court noted that the rule is "not
an end in itself.' '72 The court rejected Stevens' "formalistic approach"
in favor of a "less technical version of the 'last antecedent rule' in
order to accomplish the cardinal rule of statutory construction, which is
to determine legislative intent. 73
Thus, the court concluded that the phrase "for the purpose of sale"
modifies the three clauses connected by "or":
A.

(1) conveyances which are used to transport controlled substances; (2)
conveyances which are intended for use to transport controlled substances; or (3) conveyances which are used in any manner to facilitate
the transportation of controlled substances. 74
The court then held that section
cases where an individual possesses
of selling it.
The court bolstered its statutory
and cases interpreting that act. 75
holding that forfeiture is allowed

30-31-34(D) allows forfeiture only in
a controlled substance for the purpose
construction by examining the UCSA
In addition, the court's rationale in
only when drugs are transported for

69. 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 115 N.M. at 649, 857 P.2d at 49 (citing U~n'. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
ACT § 505(a)(4) & cmt., 9 U.L.A. 835 (1970)). The court specifically rejected the City of Deming's
argument that the court could not rely on the UCSA for guidance. Id.
70. 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 115 N.M. at 648, 857 P.2d at 48.
One definition of the last antecedent rule is "the last word, phrase, or clause that can be made
an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sentence." 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.33 (5th ed. 1992). Therefore, a restrictive clause (such
as "for purpose of sale") would only apply to the provision or clause immediately preceding it (in
our case "in any manner to facilitate the transportation"). Id. However,
[w]here the sense of the entire act requires that a qualifying word or phrase apply
to several preceding ... sections, the word or phrase will not be restricted to its
immediate antecedent.
Id. (emphasis added).
71. 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 115 N.M. at 648, 857 P.2d at 48 (citing Hale v. Basin Motor Co.,
110 N.M. 314, 795 P.2d 1006 (1990)).
72. 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 115 at 648, 857 P.2d at 48 (citing SINGER, supra note 70).
73. 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 115 N.M. at 647, 857 P.2d at 47 (citing D'avignon v. Graham, 113
N.M. 129, 131, 823 P.2d 929, 931 (Ct. App. 1991) ("legislative intent is first sought by reference
to the plain meaning found in the language of the legislature," and "formalistic and mechanistic
interpretation of statutory language" must be rejected)).
74. Id.
75. 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 115 N.M. at 648-49, 857 P.2d at 48-49; see also supra notes 31-36
and accompanying text.
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76
the purpose of sale was guided by the decisions in other jurisdictions.
One other factor which the court considered in disallowing forfeiture in
personal use cases was the reticence of the state legislature to affirmatively
adopt language indicating that simple possession permitted forfeiture.,'
Finally, the court noted that in quasi-criminal proceedings, it "must
78
'
construe any ambiguity in the statutory scheme against the state."
The court also faced the issue of whether the legislature wanted section
79
30-31-34(D) read in conjunction with section 30-31-34(G)(3) to permit
80
forfeiture in all cases where a felony drug crime was involved. The
court construed section 30-31-34(D) and section 30-31-34(G)(3) as allowing
forfeiture only in trafficking cases where the crime involves a felony."
Therefore, the purpose of section 30-31-34(G)(3) is to exclude misdemeanor
82
trafficking offenses instead of permitting all felony drug crimes. The
court applied this rationale because some trafficking/distributing offenses
within the New Mexico Controlled Substances Act are misdemeanors,
and (D) otherwise would make these
and reading section 830-31-34(G)(3)
3
sections unnecessary.

V.

CONCLUSION

The New Mexico Court of Appeals' holding, preventing forfeiture of
vehicles in personal use cases, clearly meets the problem presented by a
civil forfeiture statute. On the one hand, the civil narcotics forfeiture
statute should be broad enough to allow the act to reach the goal stated
in the UCSA of combatting drug traffickers. The decision in 1990 Chevrolet Pickup has not made it any more difficult to carry out the intent
''
of the state legislature to "deprive drug traffickers of needed mobility."
Indeed, the court has interpreted section 30-31-34(D) narrowly so that
private citizens have a clear understanding of the law and will not be
subject to needlessly random enforcement of a vague statute. 1990 Chev-

76. 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 115 N.M. at 648-49, 857 P.2d 48-49; see also supra notes 37-43 and
accompanying text.
77. 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 115 N.M. at 649, 857 P.2d at 49.
78. Id. (citing State v. Ozarek, 91 N.M. 275, 573 P.2d 209 (1978)).
79. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-34(G)(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). The section states that notwithstanding
subsection D: "a conveyance is not subject to forfeiture for a violation of law the penalty for
which is a misdemeanor .... "
80. 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 115 N.M. at 649, 857 P.2d at 49. The distinction is between all
felony drug crimes and those felony drug crimes which involve trafficking or distributing (drug
dealing).
81. Id.
82. Id. The State and City's interpretation would permit forfeiture whenever a felony was charged,
regardless of whether it involved drug dealing (trafficking/distributing) or another type of drug
offense.
83. See SINGER, supra note 70, § 51.02. The court also rejected the argument that Alexander
v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973) compelled the court of appeals to follow the holding
in Stevens on the grounds that the court was not bound to follow the superseded statute. 1990
Chevrolet Pickup, 115 N.M. at 649, 857 P.2d at 49.
84. 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 115 N.M. at 648, 857 P.2d at 48.
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rolet Pickup accomplishes this goal by setting a clear standard which
permits forfeiture only in cases where drug dealing/trafficking is involved.
The court's holding has important ramifications for government entities
in New Mexico. By eliminating personal consumption of drugs from the
harsh effects of forfeiture, it enables government entities to focus time
and energy on thwarting the drug dealer. The court's adoption of a less
technical version of the "last antecedent rule" avoids the problem of
statutory analysis which may be technically correct but which erroneously
interprets the legislatures intent in adopting the statute.
The court is on firm ground in assuming that since the New Mexico
Legislature has not enacted any specific legislation to allow forfeiture in
personal consumption cases, the legislature does not intend the general
forfeiture statute to allow it.85 The court of appeals has sent a clear
message to the state legislature that if it wants to allow forfeiture in
personal use cases, it needs to enact a specific provision that provides
for forfeiture when drugs are possessed for personal use.8 6
The decision in 1990 Chevrolet Pickup is a timely response to an issue
that has received increased attention in other state jurisdictions as well
as the federal courts. The ruling in this case follows on the heels of a
United States Supreme Court case that is redefining and narrowing the
constitutionality of civil forfeiture provisions, as well as opening a door
to discussion of whether forfeiture has gone too far as a method of
punishment.87 Forfeiture statutes should not be used as a tool to sweeten
local enforcement agencies coffers at the expense of private citizens.8 8
The court's ruling will prevent abuses of this type in New Mexico.
The law in New Mexico concerning civil in rem forfeiture in drug
cases is now clear and predictable. For the drug users who are contemplating becoming drug dealers, and for those who are already trafficking
in drugs, 1990 Chevrolet Pickup establishes a line that they cross at their
own risk.
PATRICK J. MARTINEZ

85.
86.
87.
88.
statute

Id. at 649, 857 P.2d at 49.
Id.
See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
See, e.g., State v. Fouse, 355 N.W.2d 366 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (purpose of forfeiture
is not to profit enforcement agencies at expense of innocent third parties).

